

# 1 **COVID-19 Vaccination Willingness: Investigating the** 2 **Predictors Pre- and Post-Vaccination Start in** 3 **Germany**

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14

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## 18 **Data Availability Statement**

19 The datasets presented in this study can be found in online repositories. The names of the  
20 repository/repositories and accession number(s) can be found below:

21 <https://zenodo.org/record/4590017> and <https://zenodo.org/record/4946140>.

## 22 **Introduction**

23 For many, vaccines are a desperately needed ray of hope in this midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.

24 However, voluntary immunisation can only be effective if a large proportion of the population is

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25 willing to take the vaccine. This vaccination willingness is shaped by publics' attitudes towards  
26 the vaccines. Attitudes play a central role in people's everyday lives and are typically built on  
27 previous experiences and memory processes. However, when people are confronted with a new  
28 object, like a new vaccine, they are also able to immediately construct attitudes towards the  
29 unfamiliar object (Fazio, 2007; Schwarz, 2007). Those "spontaneous" attitudes are based on  
30 available affective and cognitive associations, and are influenced by social and contextual factors  
31 (e.g., Stern et al., 1995; van Giesen et al., 2015). Thus, one crucial step in fighting the pandemic  
32 is understanding the factors influencing attitudes towards the newly developed COVID-19  
33 vaccines.

#### 34 *Factors Influencing Vaccination Willingness*

35 Anti-vaccine attitudes have existed since vaccinations were first administered. In Germany, intense  
36 debates about vaccines have taken place since the middle of the 19th century, when a mandatory  
37 smallpox vaccination for children was first introduced (Meyer & Reiter, 2004). However, as there  
38 is no compulsory vaccination in Germany today (with exception of measles for children and  
39 community or health care staff), the "power of the state" with regard to vaccinations is less  
40 prominent than in countries with more mandatory vaccinations (e.g., Italy and France).

41 Vaccine hesitancy is typically more widespread than the anti-vaxxer movement  
42 represented by a small but loud minority in a population. Vaccine hesitancy is a complex and  
43 context-specific phenomenon involving multiple factors (Harrison & Wu, 2020), such as  
44 complacency, convenience, and confidence (MacDonald & Hesitancy, 2015). Complacency  
45 includes the perceived personal risk of getting infected and becoming very sick from the disease:  
46 Where risk perception is low, vaccination hesitancy increases (Dror et al., 2020; Gilles et al., 2011;  
47 Mesch & Schwirian, 2019). Convenience then describes the ease by which the vaccine can be

48 obtained. Finally, confidence highlights trust in the vaccine and vaccination process, which  
49 numerous studies have shown to be key (Gilles et al., 2011; Lyons, 2014; Mesch & Schwirian,  
50 2019; Murphy et al., 2021; Skjefte et al., 2021; Taylor et al., 2020; van Dijck & Alinejad, 2020).

51 Trust can relate to the context of the government, the pharmaceutical industry, scientific  
52 experts, or the vaccine itself. A Swiss longitudinal study found that trust in medical organisations,  
53 not trust in the government, significantly predicted people's vaccination status (Gilles et al., 2011).  
54 In contrast, vaccination programmes in low- and middle-income countries often fail due to low  
55 trust in government (Larson, 2020). Hearing reports about the high efficacy in early vaccine  
56 candidates (Mega, 2021), others sharing their vaccination experience and increased knowledge  
57 about the vaccines can, however, enhance trust in the vaccine and reduce conspiracy beliefs  
58 (Hornsey et al., 2018; Lyons, 2014; Mesch & Schwirian, 2019; Murphy et al., 2021; van Dijck &  
59 Alinejad, 2020). On the other hand, conspiracy beliefs or a mindset that is characterised by hyper  
60 scepticism decreases willingness to be vaccinated (Hornsey et al., 2018; Lyons, 2014; Murphy et  
61 al., 2021; Rossen et al., 2019; van Dijck & Alinejad, 2020), while the freedom to decide for oneself  
62 or for one's children increases it (Harrison & Wu, 2020; Hornsey et al., 2018; Lyons, 2014; Rossen  
63 et al., 2019).

#### 64 *Current Research on COVID-19 Vaccination Willingness*

65 The current COVID-19 pandemic is characterised by a number of unique factors that have the  
66 potential to challenge the validity of the above-mentioned predictors of vaccination willingness.  
67 Firstly, the COVID-19 vaccines were developed and approved faster than ever before (Ball, 2021).  
68 For many, the rapid development of the vaccine gives rise to scepticism about both the immediate  
69 risks it poses and its possible long-term effects (Dror et al., 2020; Taylor et al., 2020). Secondly,  
70 the current pandemic has almost overnight transformed politics, the economy, and people's

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71 everyday life around the world. The global effort to fight the virus - often represented, organised,  
72 and communicated by political decision makers - has led to tensions between individual autonomy  
73 and state power. In Germany, as well as in other countries, this spilled over into e.g., anti-lockdown  
74 protests (e.g., Lange & Monscheuer, 2021) or “anti-hygienic” demonstrations in Germany (e.g.,  
75 Vieten, 2020).

76 So far, all published articles reporting predictors of COVID-19 vaccination willingness  
77 have collected most of their data pre-vaccination start: Hitherto, trust (Murphy et al., 2021; Taylor  
78 et al., 2020), conspiracy beliefs (Murphy et al., 2021), information behaviour (Murphy et al.,  
79 2021), influenza vaccination status (Dror et al., 2020) and age (Murphy et al., 2021), have been  
80 reported as significant predictors of COVID-19 vaccination willingness. Furthermore, men seem  
81 to express higher COVID-19 vaccination willingness than women, as a meta-analysis by Zintel et  
82 al. (2021) shows. In the USA, Fridman et al. (2021) conducted a longitudinal study on COVID-19  
83 vaccine willingness months before the start of mass vaccination and found political affiliation to  
84 be the main predictor of vaccination willingness, where a decrease among self-affiliated  
85 Republicans was observed, compared to a slight increase among Democrats.

### 86 *Purpose of this Study*

87 Research has already established that the general willingness to get vaccinated has increased in  
88 Germany post-vaccination start (e.g., COSMO, 2021; CovidDataHub, 2020). This paper tries to  
89 contribute to the growing literature on predictors of COVID-19 vaccination willingness.

90 Moreover, the current pandemic presents a methodological opportunity to closely study  
91 vaccination willingness pre- and post-vaccination start. While in situations of limited knowledge  
92 people rely more heavily on affective object linkages (e.g., van Giesen et al., 2015), cognitive  
93 associations become stronger over time when more information is available. It is therefore possible

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94 that predictors of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy do not equally apply pre- and post-vaccination  
95 start. To the authors' knowledge, there is no literature systematically comparing the predictors of  
96 vaccination willingness pre- and post-vaccination start within the same sample. We therefore aim  
97 to answer the following research questions:

- 98 1. Do established predictors of general vaccination willingness also apply in the context of  
99 the newly developed COVID-19 vaccines pre-vaccination start?
- 100 2. Do the predictors of COVID-19 vaccination willingness change post-vaccination start?

101 The research questions were investigated using two linked national surveys. In this paper, the pre-  
102 vaccination start survey will be referred to as “Wave 1” and the post-vaccination start survey will  
103 be referred to as “Wave 2”. Each research question was addressed with an independent analysis,  
104 hence the segmentation of this paper into “Study 1” and “Study 2”. The overall study protocol was  
105 approved by the Ethics Committee of the Sigmund Freud University.

## 106 **Study 1**

### 107 ***Methods***

#### 108 *Sampling and Data Management*

109 This study was conducted with a national survey of the German population aged 16 and over,  
110 employing relevant items examining vaccination willingness. This was done from 30 October 2020  
111 to 14 December 2020 in Germany as part of the *Viral Communication* project ([viralcomm.info](#)).

112 Respondents were recruited by sending postcard invitations to a random selection of 30,000  
113 households, using the German postal service's (Deutsche Post) address database. Addresses were  
114 stratified based initially on relative population size across federal states in Germany (DESTATIS,

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115 2020). Following data collection, survey data was cleaned and prepared for analysis, with the  
116 application of a range of inclusion criteria. Valid cases needed to include responses for *age group*,  
117 *sex*, *nationality group* (German/other), *migration background*, *federal state*, *highest school leaving*  
118 *qualification*, and *highest professional qualification*. These criteria were strictly required as  
119 weighting was applied next, using the latest available German census results (Zensus 2011, 2011).  
120 All weighting questions were exactly aligned with the census.

121 In total, 1,480 survey entries were registered. 417 respondents were excluded for not fitting  
122 the inclusion criteria, leaving a total  $N = 1,063$  respondents ( $\hat{p}_{woman} = 53\%$ ,  $M_{age} = 48.9$ ,  $SD = 18.6$   
123 [weighted]), of which a total of  $n = 936$  responded to the vaccination item in question.

#### 124 *Data Analysis*

125 In order to ascertain the baseline predictors for COVID-19 vaccination willingness, correlation  
126 analyses and independence tests were performed with the following independent variables: Socio-  
127 demographic characteristics, trust in different COVID-19 information sources, voting  
128 behaviour/intentions and self-assessment of COVID-19 risk. Due to the ordinal nature of the  
129 dependent variable, Kendall's Tau-b and -c were used to identify non-parametric correlations with  
130 other ordinal or interval variables. Kruskal-Wallis and corresponding post-hoc tests with  
131 Bonferroni correction were used for nominal independent variables. Compound variables for  
132 attitudes towards science, trust in scientific actors, trust in governmental actors and conspiracy-  
133 mindedness were computed for each respondent by taking the average of the relevant (and  
134 responded-to) items.

135 Throughout this paper, the threshold for reporting a result as statistically significant is  $\alpha <$   
136  $.05$ . Two-sided tests were performed. Only noteworthy results were reported, exhibiting at least  
137 moderate effect sizes or which are notably non-significant or small in effect size.

## 138 *Results*

139 Among the socio-demographic variables, age was identified as a predictor for vaccination  
140 willingness. Although the correlation between age and vaccination willingness was rather weak  
141 overall,  $r_{\tau} = .27$ ,  $p < .001$ , there were major differences in vaccine willingness between specific  
142 age bands at the bottom and top of the adult age distribution,  $H(7) = 114.022$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .13$   
143 (13% of variance explained). The largest differences were apparent between the age groups 20-29  
144 and 70+,  $z = 9.832$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .33$  (33% of variance explained). People aged 20-29 were most  
145 disinclined to be vaccinated against COVID-19: Almost half of this age band (viz., 48%), 95% CI  
146 [.40, .56], were “Definitely not” or “Probably not” willing to vaccinate. In contrast, 92% of people  
147 aged 70+, 95% CI [.84, .94], would have “Probably” or “Definitely” vaccinated against COVID-  
148 19.

149 At the overall level, there were statistically small differences between respondents with  
150 different professional qualifications,  $H(7) = 36.634$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .04$  (4% of variance explained).  
151 Most notably, however, people who graduated from university, academic college or art college  
152 were moderately less likely to vaccinate against COVID-19 compared to people with a degree  
153 from a university of applied sciences,  $z = 4.043$ ,  $p = .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .11$  (11% of variance explained).  
154 Vaccination willingness among people with no professional qualification was also lower than  
155 among those with a degree from a university of applied sciences,  $z = 5.015$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .08$  (8%  
156 of variance explained). There were no significant differences in vaccination willingness between  
157 women and men,  $U = 82,139.500$ ,  $p = .059$ .

158 While people’s self-reported political orientation was only very weakly negatively  
159 correlated with vaccination willingness,  $r_{\tau} = -.14$ ,  $p < .001$ , there were major differences between  
160 the political parties they would vote for in the next national parliamentary election,  $H(5) = 93.178$ ,

161  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .18$  (18% variance explained). Here, the AfD scored lowest in COVID-19  
162 vaccination willingness,  $Mdn = 1$  “Definitely not” and therefore exhibited strong differences in  
163 comparison with the CDU/CSU,  $z = 8.553$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .26$  (26% variance explained), the FDP,  
164  $z = 4.650$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .27$  (27% of variance explained), the Bündnis90/Die Grünen,  $z = 7.229$ ,  $p$   
165  $< .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .28$  (28% of variance explained), the SPD,  $z = 6.201$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .30$  (30% variance  
166 explained), and most strongly, Die Linke,  $z = 8.657$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .72$  (72% of variance explained).

167 Some effects related to information behaviour were observed as well. There were  
168 significant differences in whether people in Germany were willing to vaccinate against COVID-  
169 19 between the means with which they accessed their primary news source on the pandemic  
170 situation,  $\chi^2(12) = 89.046$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $V = .14$  (2% of variance explained). Here, people who used  
171 social media were significantly less likely to vaccinate compared to those who used television,  $p$   
172  $< .001$ , radio,  $p < .001$ , print newspaper,  $p < .001$ , or mobile apps,  $p < .001$ . When it came to  
173 differences between social media platforms,  $\chi^2(12) = 90.335$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $V = .20$  (4% of variance  
174 explained), Facebook-users were significantly more likely to reject the vaccine,  $p = .011$ , and  
175 people who did not use social media were more likely to vaccinate than those using Facebook,  $p$   
176  $< .001$ ; WhatsApp, Threema or Telegram,  $p = .002$ ; YouTube,  $p = .001$ ; and Instagram,  $p < .001$ .

177 Trust in relevant governmental and scientific actors as reliable sources of information on  
178 COVID-19 was also an important factor as there were moderate positive correlations with trust in  
179 governmental actors,  $r_t = .36$ ,  $p < .001$  (13% of variance explained), and scientific actors,  $r_t = .39$ ,  
180  $p < .001$  (15% variance explained). It was also found that vaccination willingness negatively  
181 correlated with anger over the COVID-19 regulations,  $r_t = -.30$ ,  $p < .001$  (9% of variance  
182 explained).



183           There were significant moderate differences in vaccination willingness between people  
184 who considered themselves to be at high risk of developing serious health complications from  
185 COVID-19 and those who did not,  $U = 30335.000$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .11$  (11% of variance explained).  
186 This effect size dropped significantly,  $z = 2.876$ ,  $p = .004$ , when it came to whether they considered  
187 someone else in their household to be at risk,  $U = 42,470.000$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .03$  (3% of variance  
188 explained). We additionally examined the relationship between age and personal risk perception  
189 as a potential mediator for the age trend described above. Indeed, the odds of perceiving oneself  
190 to be at high risk of developing serious health issues from COVID-19 increased by the factor of  
191 1.05 for each increment in age,  $B = 0.049$ ,  $SE = 0.005$ ,  $Wald = 99.941$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $Exp(B) = 1.050$ ,  
192 95% CI [1.040, 1.060].

193           People who had gotten the Flu vaccine within the last nine months were far more likely to  
194 vaccinate against COVID-19 than those who had not,  $U = 25,742.000$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .28$  (28% of  
195 variance explained). COVID-19 vaccination willingness was additionally strongly positively  
196 correlated with the willingness to vaccinate against the Flu,  $r_\tau = .61$ ,  $p < .001$  (37% of variance  
197 explained).

Table 1. Correlation matrix showing ordinal predictors of COVID-19 vaccination willingness (Wave 1).

Kendall's tau	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 COVID-19 vaccination willingness	1.00													
2 Age	.27**	1.00												
3 Science Attitudes	.30**	.09**	1.00											
4 Concern over own health	.28**	.20**	.19**	1.00										
5 Anger over Corona regulations	-.30**	-.13**	-.29**	-.36**	1.00									
6 Trust in Angela Merkel	.35**	-.02	.34**	.24**	-.38**	1.00								
7 Trust in Christian Drosten	.41**	.10**	.41**	.14**	-.42**	.58**	1.00							
8 Trust in Jens Spahn	.33**	.06	.43**	.19**	-.42**	.71**	.62**	1.00						
9 Trust in German Public Health Ministry	.36**	.02	.47**	.22**	-.35**	.67**	.64**	.77**	1.00					
10 Trust in WHO	.28**	.09**	.29**	.25**	-.29**	.47**	.55**	.51**	.62**	1.00				
11 Trust in state government	.32**	.02	.30**	.20**	-.38**	.60**	.58**	.62**	.63**	.53**	1.00			
12 Trust in Robert Koch Institute	.37**	.08**	.36**	.26**	-.41**	.64**	.76**	.64**	.66**	.66**	.63**	1.00		
13 Frequency in accessing Twitter	-.44**	.23*	-.17	.54**	-.12	.30**	-.08	.23*	.05*	.23	.29**	.34**	1.00	
14 Conspiracy mindedness	-.27**	-.07**	-.27**	-.06*	.29**	-.40**	-.38**	-.39**	-.38**	-.34**	-.26**	-.40**	.48**	1.00

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2. Summary of noteworthy Mann-Whitney U tests for binary predictors of COVID-19 vaccination willingness (Wave 1).

	U	z	p	$\eta^2$
Perceived personal risk	30335.000	8.160	.000	.11
Perceived risk of household member	42470.000	4.440	.000	.03
Flu Vaccine in last 9 months	25742.000	14.951	.000	.28

*Table 3. Summary of noteworthy Kruskal-Wallis tests and post-hoc pairwise comparisons for non-binary nominal predictors of COVID-19 vaccination willingness (Wave 1).*

	<i>H</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i> <sup>a</sup>	$\eta^2$	<i>z</i>
<b>Age Group</b>	114.022	6	.000	.13	
15 - 19 vs. 70+			.000	.16	4.941
20 - 29 vs. 50 - 59			.000	.13	6.324
20 - 29 vs. 60 - 69			.000	.12	5.806
20 - 29 vs. 70+			.000	.33	9.832
30 - 39 vs. 70+			.000	.11	5.640
40 - 49 vs. 70+			.000	.14	6.722
<b>Personal Qualification</b>	36.634	5	.000	.04	
University, Academic College vs. University of Applied Sciences			.001	.11	4.043
No Professional Qualification vs. University of Applied Sciences			.000	.08	5.015
Technical college degree vs. University of Applied Sciences			.008	.07	3.450
<b>Political Affiliation</b>	93.178	5	.000	.18	
AfD vs. SPD			.000	.30	6.201
AfD vs. FDP			.000	.27	4.650
AfD vs. Bündnis90/Die Grünen			.000	.28	7.229
AfD vs. CDU/CSU			.000	.26	8.553
AfD vs. Die Linke			.000	.72	8.657
SPD vs. Die Linke			.018	.09	3.237

a. For pairwise comparisons, significance values have been adjusted by the Bonferroni correction for multiple tests

199

## 200 *Discussion*

201 In accordance with previous research on vaccination willingness, we found that high trust in  
 202 scientific and governmental actors, risk perception, positive attitudes towards science, influenza  
 203 vaccination status and social media usage positively predicted vaccination willingness for the  
 204 COVID-19 vaccine. The strongest relationship was found between the influenza vaccination status  
 205 and the willingness to get the COVID-19 vaccine. General conspiracy mindedness, the belief in a  
 206 vaccination conspiracy theory, as well as anger over the Corona regulations negatively predicted  
 207 vaccination willingness. With some exceptions (i.e., trust in governmental actors and age being  
 208 more relevant), our results prove that established predictors of vaccination willingness also hold  
 209 true in the context of the COVID-19 (pre-vaccination start).

210 In line with the work by Murphy et al. (2021), we showed that people who used social  
211 media as means of accessing information about the pandemic were significantly more likely to  
212 reject the COVID-19 vaccine. This might be due to the influence of social media as a driver of  
213 misinformation as a result of self-reinforcing echo-chambers (Del Vicario et al., 2016). The  
214 number of Facebook-users rejecting the vaccine particularly stood out, meaning that anti-  
215 vaccination content could be spreading particularly effectively on this platform.

216 In contrast to the findings by Gilles et al. (2011), we found trust in governmental and  
217 scientific actors to be equally important in the context of the newly developed vaccine in Germany.  
218 The COVID-19 vaccine being a highly political topic with German politicians actively promoting  
219 the vaccine, trust in governmental actors seems to be especially relevant in this context.

220 Secondly, in contrast to previous research (Hornsey et al., 2018), age was found to be a  
221 major predictor in the case of COVID-19. This finding is possibly unique for this disease,  
222 considering the increasing risk of serious health issues with increasing age. In fact, we found a  
223 significant relationship between age and perceived personal risk of developing serious health  
224 issues from COVID-19. This is supported by research indicating that higher vaccination intentions  
225 are predicted by a higher perceived risk of COVID-19 (Glöckner et al., 2020; Malik et al., 2020).

226 An additional predictor was individuals' political affiliation. People who would have voted  
227 for the far-right party AfD in a national election were far more likely to be vaccine hesitant.  
228 However, this might not fully be due to their political views, as the weak correlation with political  
229 orientation showed. This could rather be a result of categorical opposition to the status quo, a lack  
230 of trust, and unconventional/alternative views and mindsets: Niedermayer and Hofrichter (2016)  
231 have pointed out that the majority of AfD-voters do not exhibit extremist far-right views and that  
232 this constituency consists of diverse socio-demographic groups which tend not to not trust the

233 more established parties and which tend to vote for an alternative party as a form of protest (Pickel,  
234 2019).

235 There was no significant relationship between gender and vaccination willingness. This  
236 study can therefore not confirm the findings of other works (see Zintel et al., 2021), at least when  
237 it comes to the German context.

## 238 **Study 2**

### 239 ***Methods***

#### 240 *Sampling and Data Management*

241 Upon completion of the Wave 1 survey, respondents were invited to remain on the project's contact  
242 list to participate in a follow-up survey (Wave 2) approximately three months later. Thus, the Wave  
243 2 survey conducted between 2 March 2021 and 22 March 2021 was only completed by a subset of  
244 Wave 1 respondents who accepted the invitation. The Wave 1 and Wave 2 datasets were merged  
245 while only retaining entries from respondents who participated in both surveys. The same inclusion  
246 criteria as in Study 1 were applied in order to subsequently weight according to the latest census  
247 distributions (Zensus 2011, 2011). The final sample size was  $N = 484$  ( $\hat{p}_{woman} = 51\%$ ,  $M_{age} = 48.2$ ,  
248  $SD = 17.9$  [weighted]), of which  $n = 407$  responded to the vaccination item both in Wave 1 and  
249 Wave 2. It must be noted that this subsample is likely not fully representative of the population  
250 due to the self-selective nature of the subsampling approach.

#### 251 *Data Analysis*

252 The same correlation analyses and independence tests as in Study 1 were conducted for Wave 1  
253 and Wave 2 in order to perform a repeated measures analysis. The comparisons between the Wave  
254 1 and Wave 2 surveys themselves involved identifying significant differences in effect sizes by

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255 converting  $r$ -coefficients into  $z$ -scores (Fisher's  $z$ -transformation) and subsequently performing  $z$ -  
256 tests. Additionally, Wilcoxon sign-rank tests were performed to assess the degree to which  
257 vaccination willingness, trust in governmental actors and anger over COVID-19 regulations  
258 changed between Wave 1 and Wave 2.

259 It is important to note that due to the smaller and more selective sample in this study, there  
260 were inconsistencies between the identified Wave 1 predictors in Study 1 (representative sample)  
261 and Study 2 (limited subsample). The mismatches were related to the following independent  
262 variables: *political orientation*, *frequency of accessing Instagram*, *frequency of accessing Twitter*,  
263 and *school leaving qualification*. To minimise type I and type II errors, the repeated measures  
264 analysis only included trends whose Wave 1 results matched the representative cross-sectional  
265 analysis (Study 1) in their significance (i.e., whether they were both significant or not). This means  
266 that trends involving the independent variables mentioned above were excluded.

## 267 ***Results***

### 268 *Trends in COVID-19 Vaccine Willingness and Attitudes towards the Government*

269 Before mass vaccination for COVID-19 began in Germany at the end of 2020, over half of the  
270 population was willing to get vaccinated, 95% CI [.56, .66]. In March 2021, this number  
271 significantly increased to three quarters of the population, 95% CI [.71, .80]. Inversely, rejection  
272 of the vaccine declined from about one quarter, 95% CI [.22, .31] to around one tenth, 95% CI  
273 [.09, .15]. A Wilcoxon sign-rank test shows that the increase in vaccine willingness amounted to  
274 an overall large difference between both measurement points,  $z = 7.007$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .15$  (15%  
275 of variance explained).

276 At the same time, trust in governmental actors decreased greatly,  $z = -9.691$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 =$   
277  $.27$  (27% of variance explained). This decline in trust was particularly evident for Angela Merkel,

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278  $z = -7.489, p < .001, \eta^2 = .16$ , and Jens Spahn,  $z = -9.640, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$  (27% of variance  
279 explained). Trust in prominent German virologist Christian Drosten and the WHO did not change  
280 significantly,  $z = -0.374, p = .709$ , and  $z = -1.551, p = .121$ . We also observed a strong increase in  
281 anger over the COVID-19 regulations,  $z = 8.842, p < .001, \eta^2 = .21$  (21% of variance explained).

### 282 *Shifting Predictors for COVID-19 Vaccine Willingness*

283 We found important changes in the predictors of vaccine willingness following the onset of mass  
284 vaccination in Germany. Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 provide an overview of the independent  
285 variables and their development from Wave 1 to Wave 2.

286 The differences in vaccination willingness between age groups were subject to some  
287 change over time: The Kruskal-Wallis pairwise comparison for this variable showed that the gap  
288 between the age groups 16-19 and 70+ which was significant in Wave 1,  $z = 3.857, p = .002$ , was  
289 not significant in Wave 2,  $z = 3.032, p = .051$ . The same applied to the differences between people  
290 aged 50-59 and 70+,  $z = 3.098, p < .041$  vs.  $z = 2.111, p = .731$ . The effect size inherent in the  
291 difference between age group 30-39 and 70+ significantly diminished over time,  $z = -4.158, p <$   
292  $.001$ , from  $z = 8.830, p < .001, \eta^2 = .67$  (67% of variance explained) to  $z = 5.096, p < .001, \eta^2 =$   
293  $.26$  (26% of variance explained).

294 The effects of whether people had the German nationality or not were not significant in  
295 Wave 1,  $U = 2,263.000, p = .374$ , but they were significant in Wave 2,  $U = 2,263.000, p < .001$ ,  
296  $\eta^2 = .04$  (4% of variance explained). Similarly, whether people had a migration background did  
297 not have a significant effect on vaccination willingness at first,  $U = 7,655.500, p = .361$ , while there  
298 was a significant moderate difference in Wave 2,  $U = 4,745.500, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$  (10% of  
299 variance explained). German residents with a foreign nationality or with a migration background  
300 were less likely to be willing to vaccinate against COVID-19.

301           There were some differences in the pairwise comparisons for professional qualification,  
302 although the overall effect inherent in the Kruskal-Wallis test did not differ significantly,  $z =$   
303  $0.896, p = .370$ . The significant difference between people without a professional qualification and  
304 those with a degree from a university of applied sciences,  $z = 3.602, p = .005, \eta^2 = .11$  (11% of  
305 variance explained), became non-significant in the second survey,  $z = 2.761, p = .086$ .

306           The effects of political affiliation changed dramatically. The differences between people  
307 who would vote for the AfD and those who would vote for the Bündnis90/Die Grünen increased  
308 significantly,  $z = 3.153, p = .002$ , from  $z = 4.980, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$  (27% of variance explained)  
309 to  $z = 6.621, p < .001, \eta^2 = .64$  (64% of variance explained). The difference between AfD and die  
310 Linke increased significantly as well,  $z = 13.767, p < .001$ , from  $z = 3.990, p = .001, \eta^2 = .27$  (27%  
311 of variance explained) to  $z = 6.390, p < .001, \eta^2 = .99$  (99% of variance explained).

312           The influence of one's self-perception as a person at risk of developing serious health  
313 issues did not change over time,  $z = 1.329, p = .184$ . However, the effect based on the perception  
314 of whether *someone else* in the same household was at risk changed from significant,  $U =$   
315  $7,379.500, p < .001, \eta^2 = .28$  (28% of variance explained), to non-significant,  $U = 9,374.000, p =$   
316  $.463$ .

317           On the other hand, the correlation between COVID-19 vaccine willingness with people's  
318 trust in some scientific and governmental actors increased. This included Christian Drosten,  $z =$   
319  $2.275, p = .023$ , from  $r_\tau = .14, p = .001$  (2% of variance explained) to  $r_\tau = .31, p < .001$  (10% of  
320 variance explained); the WHO,  $z = 2.706, p = .007$ , from  $r_\tau = -.10, p = .028$  (1% of variance  
321 explained) to  $r_\tau = .11, p = .021$  (1% of variance explained); and the respective state government,  $z$   
322  $= 2.200, p = .023$ , from  $r_\tau = .09, p = .041$  (1% of variance explained) to  $r_\tau = .25, p < .001$  (6% of  
323 variance explained).



*Table 4. Overview of COVID-19 vaccination willingness predictors and their development over time based on Kendall's tau-b and -c. The Study 1 column presents the representative results, while the other columns show the Wave 1 and Wave 2 comparisons.*

Kendall's tau	r			z
	Study 1		Study 2	
	Wave 1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1-Wave 2
Age	.27**	.31**	.25**	-0.927
Attitudes towards Science	.30**	.21**	.12**	-1.398
Concern over own Health	.28**	.19**	.23**	0.538
Anger over Corona Regulations	-.30**	-.13**	-.12**	0.203
Conspiracy Mindedness	-.27**	-.24**	-.32**	-1.122
Belief in Vaccination Conspiracy	-.32**	-.11**	-.21**	-1.359
Trust in Scientific Actors	.39**	.16**	.22**	0.876
Trust in Governmental Actors	.36**	.19**	.21**	0.172
Trust in Angela Merkel	.35**	.11*	.17**	0.814
Trust in Christian Drosten	.41**	.14*	.31**	2.275*
Trust in Jens Spahn	.33**	.12**	.26**	1.918
Trust in Federal Health Ministry	.36**	.14**	.10*	0.515
Trust in WHO	.28**	-.10*	.11*	2.706*
Trust in State Government	.32**	.09*	.25**	2.200*
Trust in RKI	.37**	.15*	.20**	0.662

\*\* . Effect is significant at the .01 level.

\* . Effect is significant at the .05 level.

*Table 5. Overview of COVID-19 vaccination willingness predictors and their development over time based on Mann-Whitney U tests. The Study 1 column presents the representative results, while the other columns show the Wave 1 and Wave 2 comparisons.*

Mann-Whitney U	$\eta^2$			z
	Study 1		Study 2	
	Wave 1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1-Wave 2
Nationality Group	.00	.00	.04**	
Migration Status	.00	.01	.10**	
Perceived personal risk	.11**	.22**	.14**	1.329
Perceived risk of household member	.03**	.08**	.00	
Flu Vaccine in last 9 months	.28**	.22**	.14**	1.469

\*\* . Effect is significant at the .01 level.

\* . Effect is significant at the .05 level.

Table 6. Overview of COVID-19 vaccination willingness predictors and their development over time based on Kruskal-Wallis H tests. The Study 1 column presents the representative results, while the other columns show the Wave 1 and Wave 2 comparisons.

Kruskal-Wallis H	$\eta^2$			z
	Study 1	Study 2		z
	Wave 1	Wave 1	Wave 2	
<b>Age Group</b>				
16-19 vs. 70+	.13**	.24**	.16**	-1.525
20-29 vs. 70+	.16**	.18**	.14	
30-39 vs. 70+	.33**	.29**	.47*	1.655
40-49 vs. 70+	.11**	.67**	.26**	-4.158**
50-59 vs. 70+	.14**	.14**	.12**	-0.190
60-69 vs. 70+	.04**	.08*	.04	
60-69 vs. 70+	.04**	.19**	.13**	-0.671
<b>Professional Qualification</b>				
No Professional Qualification vs. University of Applied Sciences	.04**	.07**	.04**	-0.896
	.08**	.11**	.06	
<b>Political Affiliation</b>				
AfD vs. Bündnis90/Die Grünen	.18**	.47**	.50**	0.378
AfD vs. Die Linke	.28**	.27**	.64**	3.153**
AfD vs. CDU/CSU	.72**	.27**	.99**	13.767**
AfD vs. CDU/CSU	.26**	.30**	.33**	0.299

\*\* . Effect is significant at the .01 level.

\* . Effect is significant at the .05 level.

325

## 326 *Discussion*

### 327 *Shifting Predictors of COVID-19 Vaccination Willingness (Pre- and Post-* 328 *Vaccination Start)*

329 We observed interesting patterns when looking at how predictors of COVID-19 vaccination  
330 willingness change pre- and post-vaccination start. On the one hand, some of the predictors turned  
331 from being significant pre-vaccination start to not being significant post-vaccination start. On the  
332 other hand, we observed variables shifting from a non-significant to a significant relationship with  
333 COVID-19 vaccination willingness post-vaccination start, as well as significant changes in effect  
334 size.

335 Overall, the effect of age as a predictor for vaccination willingness somewhat diminished  
336 over time when looking at specific age group comparisons. This can be explained by the general  
337 increase in vaccination willingness which reduced the differences between these age groups. As

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338 previously mentioned, people rely more heavily on affective object linkages (e.g., van Giesen et  
339 al., 2015) in situations where knowledge is limited, while cognitive associations become stronger  
340 over time when more information is available. Early on, vaccination willingness was significantly  
341 higher for older age groups that also faced a higher risk of developing severe symptoms. As an  
342 affective association, this fear might have driven vaccination willingness pre-vaccination start  
343 among older generations, while vaccination willingness in younger people increased later on, when  
344 more information became available. Nevertheless, the magnitude of variation among age groups  
345 did not decrease significantly, and the overall trend towards higher vaccination willingness with  
346 increasing age remained with the notable exception of 16- to 19-year-olds.

347         The differences between the AfD and left-wing political parties such as the Bündnis90/Die  
348 Grünen and Die Linke increased over time, indicating a polarisation in vaccination willingness  
349 between people affiliated with more established parties and the right-wing AfD. A cause of this  
350 could be the self-reinforcing echo-chambers as people who vote for the AfD also tend to have  
351 more deeply rooted alternative views and a higher conspiracy mindedness. This is supported by  
352 Flew's (2019) argument that misinformation as the result of a larger trust crisis is additionally  
353 fuelled by these echo-chambers. Intentions to vaccinate can be influenced by misinformation  
354 (Jolley & Douglas, 2014) and conspiracy beliefs (Blaskiewicz, 2013; Hornsey et al., 2018); this  
355 has been shown to apply in the COVID-19 context as well (Bertin et al., 2020; Čavojová et al.,  
356 2020; Jensen et al., 2021). Our German findings show parallels with evidence from the USA  
357 indicating polarisation between Republicans and Democrats on the issue of COVID-19 vaccination  
358 over time (Fridman et al., 2021).

359           The correlation with trust in Christian Drosten, the WHO and the state government saw a  
360 significant increase in effect size, indicating that the trust as a mediator for vaccination willingness  
361 has become more important.

362           Ultimately, nationality and migration status emerged as unexpected predictors as  
363 vaccination willingness seems to have increased at a slower rate for people with a foreign  
364 nationality or a migration background. Further research would be needed to identify the reasons  
365 for this difference, but regardless, German residents with a foreign nationality or with a migration  
366 background were generally less willing to get vaccinated against COVID-19. This could be due to  
367 language barriers, certain information behaviours, religious factors, or a higher susceptibility to  
368 misinformation about vaccines. This is an especially important finding since new infections among  
369 migrants tend to be higher than among non-migrants in Germany, e.g., due to cramped living  
370 conditions (Hintermeier et al., 2021).

## 371 **Conclusion**

### 372 *Limitations*

373 From the survey items employed in both studies, the increase in COVID-19 vaccination  
374 willingness could not be explained sufficiently. One factor responsible for this increase might be  
375 that the vaccine is seen as a means to end the long period of regulations. Although the positive  
376 correlation with trust in governmental actors did not generally change significantly over time,  
377 vaccination willingness increased while trust in governmental actors decreased. However, a  
378 change in the negative correlation with anger over the regulations could not be confirmed, possibly  
379 due to the limited subsample (Study 2). Other factors which could be explored in future research  
380 (perhaps more qualitative) are people's explicit reasoning for getting or not getting the vaccine,

381 proximity to people who have been vaccinated, increased knowledge about the vaccine(s), the  
382 benefits that might come with immunisation, as well as that vaccination against COVID-19  
383 evolved from a hypothetical scenario to reality.

### 384 *Implications*

385 Our studies were able to show the applicability of most established predictors of vaccine hesitancy  
386 to the COVID-19 context, but not all of those predictors are stable over time. The results suggest  
387 that timely and evidence-based communication campaigns are needed to increase vaccination  
388 willingness in a general manner. In order to counter effects based on certain socio-demographics,  
389 specific communication endeavours also need to be targeted at groups which either have lower  
390 willingness from the start or those which are likely to “fall behind” in the future. This is particularly  
391 important as some of these groups could be marginalised communities which would otherwise  
392 experience more tenuous health situations and subsequently increased social inequality.

393 Finally, trust is a pivotal factor in science communication and crisis management (see  
394 Borchelt & Nielsen, 2014; Guenther & Weingart, 2016; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; Siegrist et al.,  
395 2007; Siegrist & Zingg, 2014). This also holds true in the context of vaccination willingness (Gilles  
396 et al., 2011; Lyons, 2014; Mesch & Schwirian, 2019; Murphy et al., 2021; Skjefte et al., 2021;  
397 Taylor et al., 2020; van Dijck & Alinejad, 2020), and specifically when it comes to COVID-19  
398 vaccination, as this study’s results show. This work provides yet more evidence for the importance  
399 of long-term communication led by scientific stakeholders, aimed at building relationships of trust  
400 with diverse publics. Trust in political actors also arose as an important factor in the context of  
401 COVID-19. This indicates that future evidence-based management of highly politicised issues and  
402 crises (e.g., Jensen, 2020; Jensen & Gerber, 2020) could be enhanced with a public affairs and  
403 political communication agenda which increasingly focuses on fostering trust among publics.

404

405 All authors attest they meet the ICMJE criteria for authorship.

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## 545 **Appendix A: Survey Design**

546 For each of the survey items described below, respondents were given “Unsure” and/or “Prefer  
547 not to say” as a response option. Likert-type and semantic differential items included a “Not  
548 applicable / No Opinion” response option.

### 549 *Vaccination Willingness*

550 For the section on voluntary vaccination, the question “Would you take the following measures on  
551 a voluntary basis?” was followed by the item “Coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccination.”  
552 Respondents were able to answer by means of a 5-point Likert-type scale including the options  
553 “Definitely not,” “Probably not,” “Maybe,” “Probably” and “Definitely”. Respondents were also  
554 asked to indicate whether or not they had gotten vaccinated against influenza in the last nine  
555 months.

### 556 *Socio-demographics*

557 Respondents were asked to indicate their age, gender, nationality, migration background, state of  
558 residence, education, professional qualification, working situation, occupation, and political  
559 orientation (on a scale from -3 = far left until +3 = far right). They were also asked about their  
560 political affiliation with the question: “Which political party would you vote for if there was a  
561 national election held today?”.

### 562 *Trust in Political and Scientific Actors*

563 To measure trust in key institutional sources of information on the pandemic (i.e., RKI, WHO,  
564 respective state government, German Public Health Ministry, German health minister Jens Spahn,  
565 German virologist Christian Drosten and Angela Merkel), respondents were asked to rate their

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566 level of trust on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from “Completely distrust” to “Completely  
567 trust,” with “Neutral” as the midpoint.

568 A different item asked respondents to rate their level of agreement with the statement: “The  
569 Corona regulations anger me,” using a 7-point Likert-type scale from “Strongly disagree” to  
570 “Strongly agree” with a “Neutral” midpoint.

### 571 *Information Behaviour*

572 Respondents were asked how they accessed their primary news source for information about the  
573 pandemic with a multiple-choice question, including the response options: “Television,” “News  
574 website,” “Radio,” “Social media,” “Print newspaper” and “Mobile app.”

575 Another multiple-choice item asked about the social media and messaging platforms used  
576 to access their selected primary news source, including “Facebook,” “WhatsApp, Telegram, or  
577 Threema,” “YouTube,” “Instagram,” and “Twitter.” An additional option was provided: “I do not  
578 use social media.”

579 For measuring the frequency with which respondents accessed information about the  
580 COVID-19 situation on the different social media and messaging platforms they had selected in  
581 the previous item, they were given a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from “Never” to “Always,”  
582 with “Sometimes” as the midpoint for each platform (using the same platform options referenced  
583 above).

### 584 *Risk Assessment*

585 Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they considered themselves to be at high risk  
586 of developing serious health complications from COVID-19. They were also asked whether or not  
587 they considered someone else in their household to be at high risk. They were given a 7-point

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588 Likert-type scale to register their response, from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree” with a  
589 “Neutral” midpoint.

590 Respondents were also given the same response options to indicate their level of agreement  
591 with the statement: “I am concerned about my own health.”