

1 **Making sense of unfamiliar COVID-19 vaccines:** 2 **How national origin affects vaccination willingness**

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14 **Abstract**

15 Vaccination willingness is a critical factor in pandemics, including the COVID-19 crisis. Therefore,
16 investigating underlying drivers of vaccination willingness/hesitancy is an essential social science
17 contribution. The present study of German residents investigates the mental shortcuts people are using
18 to make sense of unfamiliar vaccine options by examining vaccination willingness for different
19 vaccines using an experimental design in a quantitative survey. German vaccines were preferred over
20 equivalent foreign vaccines, and the favorability ratings of foreign countries where COVID-19
21 vaccines were developed correlated with the level of vaccination willingness for each vaccine. The
22 patterns in vaccination willingness were more pronounced when the national origin was shown along
23 with the vaccine manufacturer label. The study shows how non-scientific factors drive everyday
24 decision-making about vaccination. Taking such social psychological and communication aspects into
25 account in the design of vaccination campaigns would increase their effectiveness.

26 **Introduction**

27 A deadly coronavirus does not know national borders, nor does it care about different flags, languages,
28 or past conflicts. However, its host organisms – humans – care deeply about such things, and social
29 biases have the potential to affect the rollout of a newly developed vaccine on multiple levels. In a
30 context where few understand the intricacies of the technical differences between the different
31 available vaccines, but a practical decision about whether to vaccinate needs to be made, the public
32 needs to draw on other, non-scientific cues to fill in the gaps in information. Cues such as a vaccine's
33 national origin can be used to develop attitudes about its quality and reliability, guided by perceptions
34 of originating country. The influence of national perceptions is already apparent in the everyday
35 naming of COVID-19 vaccines around the world. For example, the vaccine developed by
36 Pfizer/BioNTech (Comirnaty) is largely being referred to as the "BioNTech" vaccine in Germany
37 (with BioNTech being a German company), while in the USA it is mainly referred to as the "Pfizer"
38 vaccine (with Pfizer being a US-American company).

39 People have the tendency to see nations as the natural, taken-for-granted state of the world and project
40 their existence back into time immemorial. This is reinforced through everyday communication when,

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41 for example, talking about a certain vaccine, but also in weather maps, national celebrations, flags,
42 football matches, and even the use of the pronouns such as ‘we’ and ‘us’ to refer to an ‘imagined
43 community’ [1] of people that belong to the same nation. In reality, nationalism is “far from being an
44 age-old ‘primordial’ condition, [but] has been produced by the age of the modern nation-state” [2 p9].
45 In its banal, taken-for granted form [2], nationalism is a key component of our everyday thinking. It is
46 used to frame a variety of decision-making processes, including health decisions such as those around
47 vaccination.

48 Medical crises are accompanied by some degree of uncertainty, which affects the practical decision-
49 making people must take on for themselves and others to try to navigate such crises. Rational theorists
50 [e.g., 3] dominate the early literature on health decision-making. These theorists propose that people
51 make health decisions based on weighing the risks and benefits of a certain behavior. Until today,
52 many interventions aiming to facilitate good health behaviors are based on those assumptions (e.g.,
53 through awareness-raising or information dissemination). However, research shows that the success of
54 this approach is limited and often lacks the power to change people’s behavior [e.g., 4, 5]. This also
55 holds true for vaccine decision-making. Simply informing people about the benefits of a vaccine and
56 the dangers of a disease such as COVID-19 is not enough to convince everyone to get vaccinated,
57 despite the scientific consensus that approved vaccines are safe and effective [6, 7].

58 Dror and colleagues [8] were able to show that, indeed, the interplay of many factors influences the
59 willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19. They collected data in Israel from 2470 physicians, life
60 science graduates (biology, virology, chemistry, etc.), and from members of the general public without
61 a life science background. They found that while the first physicians and science graduates based their
62 reasoning on the technology underpinning the vaccine (e.g., mRNA), members of the general public
63 concentrated more on the reported headline efficacy rate and the country of production. Here, the
64 Israeli public preferred vaccines coming from the USA or UK over those from China or Russia. These
65 results align with Israelis’ attitudes about those foreign countries. Silver [9] shows that 82% of the
66 people in Israel consider the USA to be their most reliable ally, while Russia and China received
67 amongst the lowest ratings. Another survey conducted by Pew Research in Germany using nationally

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68 representative sampling from March to May 2021 (overlapping with the data collection period for the
69 present study) found that the German public had a 62% favorability rating for the USA, and 63%
70 favorability for the EU in general [10, 11]. German attitudes towards China and Russia were much less
71 positive, with favorability ratings of 26% and 32%, respectively [12, 13].

72 It is thus possible that the above-mentioned ‘imagined community’ (in-group) and social
73 representation of other nations (out-groups) can influence the willingness to get vaccinated with a
74 certain product. The effect is mediated by an ‘us’-feeling, because members of a group are more
75 inclined to positive attitudes towards objects they are familiar with. This leads to positive evaluations
76 and preference of one’s own group, according to Mummendey et al. [14]. The development of specific
77 attitudes toward the “others” (out-groups) only comes in a second subordinate step. Irrespective of this
78 evaluation, however, there is a self-group bias, which functions as a projection of the individual onto
79 the collective self by generalizing a typically positive self-image to the in-group. Outgroups cannot
80 benefit from this generalization simply because they are “different” and are therefore evaluated less
81 positively. Thus, an affective component has to be added in order to understand decision-making
82 processes [e.g., 15]: People operate within a cognitive processing system (or rational system) and an
83 affective system that operates more automatically and relies on emotions. Studies on a then-
84 hypothetical COVID-19 vaccine have already indicated that people tend to prefer domestic vaccines
85 over foreign ones [16, 17, 18]). The results from Dror and colleagues [8] suggest that the in-group
86 preferences may be extended to allies that are perceived as more familiar and therefore favorable,
87 whereas out-groups are perceived as different, less familiar, and therefore less favorable.

88 No study so far has experimentally examined the influence of national origin on vaccination
89 willingness in the post-approval phase. This study is designed to further explore the role of national
90 origin from the perspective of citizens in Germany. We have formulated the following hypotheses:

91 **Hypothesis 1 (H1):** Germany’s vaccines will attract higher levels of vaccination willingness than
92 any other countries’ (in-group preferences).

93 **Hypothesis 2 (H2):** The public in Germany will indicate higher levels of vaccination willingness
94 for vaccines developed in countries that generally get more favorable ratings from them (extended in-
95 group/allies) than those developed in countries that are perceived as “the other” (out-group).

96 **Hypothesis 3 (H3):** The pattern described in H2 will be more pronounced for those in the
97 treatment group (seeing the national origin added to the vaccine label) than for the control group
98 (which only sees the vaccine manufacturer name).

99 To evaluate the above hypotheses, we empirically examined the vaccination willingness of two
100 randomly assigned groups: The first group was asked about their willingness to take a range of
101 vaccines labelled by name only; the second group received the same question and response options,
102 but was shown the national origin of each vaccine.

103 **Methods**

104 The overall study protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Sigmund Freud University.

105 **Survey design**

106 This study was conducted as part of a national survey for the Viral Communication project
107 (viralcomm.info). Respondents who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 were initially asked
108 to indicate whether they would voluntarily vaccinate against COVID-19, on a 5-point Likert-type scale
109 with “Definitely not,” “Probably not,” “Maybe,” “Probably,” “Definitely,” “Not applicable/No
110 opinion,” and “Prefer not to say” as the response options.

111 Those who selected “Maybe,” “Probably,” or “Definitely” were included in a subsequent posttest-only
112 control group experiment with random group assignment, which is seen as a stable measure to identify
113 cause-effect relationships [see 19, 20]. This particular experimental setup does not require pretesting
114 as randomized grouping ensures probabilistic equivalence [19].

115 Using the same response options as above, both the control group and the treatment group were asked
116 to indicate whether they would get vaccinated if they were offered a range of different COVID-19
117 vaccines. For each COVID-19 vaccine, the treatment group received the respective national origin for
118 each vaccine as an additional piece of information in parentheses. For example, for “BioNTech/Pfizer”

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119 as shown to the control group, the treatment group was shown “BioNTech/Pfizer (German)”. All
120 respondents were asked about the following vaccines: BioNTech/Pfizer (German), Moderna (US-
121 American), AstraZeneca (Swedish/British), CureVac (German), Johnson & Johnson (US-American),
122 Sanofi/GSK (French), Sputnik V (Russian), and Sinovac (Chinese).

123 **Sampling and data management**

124 Data were collected 2-22 March 2021 from a sample of the German population, aged 16 and above.
125 Respondents were invited to participate who had previously taken part in a probability-based survey
126 research project (end of 2020) and agreed to participate in further rounds of this study. Initial
127 recruitment to the study was achieved by sending postcard invitations to a random selection of 30,000
128 households, using the German postal service’s (Deutsche Post) address database. Addresses were
129 stratified based on relative population size across German federal states [21].

130 To be included in the analysis, respondents were required to provide data for the following variables:
131 age group, sex, nationality group (German/other), migration background, federal state, highest school
132 leaving qualification, and highest professional qualification. These criteria were strictly required as
133 weighting was applied next for the control group and treatment group using the latest available
134 German census results [22]. Sample characteristics for all weighting questions were exactly aligned
135 with the census. The final sample size was $N = 332$ ($\hat{p}_{\text{woman}} = 51\%$, $M_{\text{age}} = 48.2$, $SD = 17.2$ [weighted]).

136 **Data analysis**

137 The Summer 2020 Survey Data by Pew Research Center [23] was used to calculate the valid
138 proportions of China’s and Russia’s favorability ratings in Germany. Z-tests were performed to
139 identify significant proportion differences between the country favorability ratings and the vaccination
140 willingness related to the corresponding vaccines.

141 A related-samples Friedman test was used to identify significant differences in vaccination willingness
142 between the different vaccines, and post-hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests with Bonferroni correction
143 were performed to test for significant pairwise differences. Mann-Whitney U tests were employed to
144 identify significant differences between the control and treatment groups for each vaccine type. η^2 was
145 calculated for each significant result to indicate the individual effect size. Proportions with 95%

146 confidence intervals were ascertained for each response option, each respondent group (control and
147 treatment), and each vaccine to display potential differences more clearly. Percentages were rounded
148 to the nearest integer. Two-sided tests were conducted. Statistically significant results are reported at α
149 $< .05$ throughout this work.

150 **Results**

151 The first step in this analysis was to compare the overall vaccination willingness results for each
152 vaccine to assess whether there were statistically significant differences in willingness by vaccine. A
153 Friedman test showed clear differences, $\chi^2(7) = 470.734, p < .001$, leading us to reject the null
154 hypothesis of no differences in willingness between vaccines. Post-hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests
155 revealed that the German-developed BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine (generally known in Germany simply as
156 “BioNTech”) was strongly preferred over all other vaccines (see Table 1). The other Germany-based
157 vaccine, CureVac (which was still in the clinical trials phase at the time of the survey), was preferred
158 over Sanofi/GSK (French), Sputnik V (Russian), and Sinovac (Chinese).

159 *Table 1. Pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank comparisons with German COVID-19 vaccines for significant*
160 *Friedman test. P-values were adjusted with the Bonferroni correction.*

Pairwise comparison	z	p	η^2
BioNTech/Pfizer - Moderna	5.485	0.000	0.19
BioNTech/Pfizer - AstraZeneca	7.763	0.000	0.39
BioNTech/Pfizer - CureVac	7.681	0.000	0.43
BioNTech/Pfizer - Johnson & Johnson	7.785	0.000	0.42
BioNTech/Pfizer - Sanofi/GSK	8.332	0.000	0.56
BioNTech/Pfizer - Sputnik V	9.571	0.000	0.66
BioNTech/Pfizer - Sinovac	9.469	0.000	0.68
CureVac - Moderna	-4.994	0.000	0.18
CureVac - AstraZeneca	0.191	1.000	
CureVac - Johnson & Johnson	-1.014	1.000	
CureVac - Sanofi/GSK	6.006	0.000	0.30
CureVac - Sputnik V	8.574	0.000	0.58
CureVac - Sinovac	8.667	0.000	0.60

161 This first analytic step confirmed H1, showing BioNTech/Pfizer, the German-originated vaccine
162 currently in use, was preferred over all the others. Likewise, the other German-developed vaccine,
163 CureVac, was preferred over other vaccines in the pre-approval stage. This indicates that a key driver

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164 here is nationalism, rather than perceptions of the objective superiority of the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine
165 over other options.

166 The second step in the analysis was identifying whether the patterns in which vaccines were associated
167 with higher levels of vaccination willingness aligned with the German public's existing general
168 favorability ratings for countries outside of Germany. A Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing
169 vaccination willingness between European/US-American vaccine origins (excluding Germany) and
170 Russian/Chinese vaccine origins showed that vaccines with the former national origins were strongly
171 preferred over those with the latter origins, $z = 9.482$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .64$ (64% explained variance).
172 This result aligns with German residents' positive rating of the USA and the EU in general (62% and
173 63% favorability, respectively) [10, 11] compared to the rather negative ratings of China and Russia
174 (26% and 32%, respectively). In fact, the null hypothesis that the proportions of country favorability
175 and vaccination willingness differ significantly was accepted respectively for China, $z = .047$, $p =$
176 $.963$, and Russia, $z = .083$, $p = .934$. As Pew Research had not yet published the 2021 data, these tests
177 could not be performed for the US-American and European vaccines (excluding those developed in
178 Germany). However, the stand-alone favorability proportions and the difference in vaccination
179 willingness give reason to believe they would result similarly.

180 The third analytic step was to investigate whether there were differences between treatment and
181 control groups based on the embedded experimental design in which one group saw the vaccine
182 manufacturer name only (control), and the other group also saw the national origin associated with that
183 vaccine (treatment).

184 Statistically significant treatment effects were found for most vaccines, with national labels generally
185 having the predicted effect (see Table 2). In general, the effect sizes were weak to moderate. Johnson
186 & Johnson exhibited the strongest effect, followed by Sinovac and AstraZeneca. There was no
187 significant shift for Sputnik V.

188 Greater vaccination willingness was identified when the national origin was made explicit for the
189 following vaccines: BioNTech/Pfizer, AstraZeneca, CureVac, Johnson & Johnson, and Sanofi/GSK.
190 Moderna and Sinovac attracted a lower vaccination willingness with the national origin made explicit.

191 Table 2. Summary of Mann-Whitney U tests examining differences between the control and treatment group for
192 each COVID-19 vaccine.

Vaccine	N	U	p	η^2
BioNTech/Pfizer	289	12070.000	.001	.04
Moderna	282	11134.500	.026	.02
AstraZeneca	253	9437.500	.001	.05
CureVac	230	7469.000	.018	.02
Johnson & Johnson	246	9608.500	.000	.08
Sanofi/GSK	198	5480.500	.018	.03
Sputnik V	248	6996.000	.287	
Sinovac	200	3112.000	.000	.07

193 Table 3 shows the precise differences between the control and treatment groups for each of the
194 response options. Considering the absence of negative responses for BioNTech/Pfizer, the increase in
195 vaccination willingness for this vaccine was mainly restricted to the positive response options.
196 Although there was a strong overall shift towards the extreme negative response option (“Definitely
197 not”) for Sinovac, there was also minor polarization towards the extreme positive response
198 (“Definitely”).

199 For both the control and treatment group, BioNTech/Pfizer and Moderna received the first and second
200 highest proportions of people who would have “Probably” or “Definitely” gotten vaccinated,
201 respectively. This proportion increased for Johnson & Johnson from the fourth to the third largest
202 among all vaccines, while it dropped for Sinovac from the third to last to the last rank.

203 Table 3. Summary of proportions for each group per COVID-19 vaccine, as well as the difference for each
204 response option.

Vaccine	Response Option	Origin Not Explicit			Origin Explicit			$\Delta\hat{p}$
		\hat{p}	95% CI Lower Bound	95% CI Upper Bound	\hat{p}	95% CI Lower Bound	95% CI Upper Bound	
BioNTech/ Pfizer	Def. not	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%
	Prob. not	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%
	Maybe	2%	0%	6%	1%	0%	4%	-1%
	Probably	29%	21%	37%	14%	9%	20%	-15%
	Definitely	69%	61%	77%	85%	79%	91%	16%
Moderna	Def. not	0%	0%	3%	3%	1%	7%	3%
	Prob. not	8%	4%	14%	3%	1%	7%	-5%
	Maybe	6%	3%	12%	12%	7%	18%	5%
	Probably	37%	29%	46%	17%	11%	23%	-20%
	Definitely	49%	40%	58%	66%	58%	73%	17%
Astra- Zeneca	Def. not	29%	21%	39%	8%	4%	14%	-21%
	Prob. not	9%	4%	16%	4%	1%	8%	-5%
	Maybe	7%	3%	14%	18%	13%	25%	11%
	Probably	22%	14%	31%	27%	20%	34%	5%

	Definitely	32%	24%	42%	43%	35%	51%	11%
CureVac	Def. not	14%	8%	23%	3%	1%	8%	-11%
	Prob. not	10%	5%	18%	0%	0%	3%	-10%
	Maybe	17%	10%	26%	30%	23%	39%	14%
	Probably	28%	19%	38%	25%	18%	34%	-2%
	Definitely	31%	22%	42%	41%	33%	50%	10%
Johnson & Johnson	Def. not	13%	7%	21%	0%	0%	3%	-13%
	Prob. not	17%	10%	25%	6%	3%	11%	-11%
	Maybe	15%	9%	24%	17%	11%	24%	2%
	Probably	29%	20%	38%	33%	25%	41%	4%
	Definitely	26%	18%	35%	44%	36%	53%	18%
Sanofi/ GSK	Def. not	8%	3%	16%	7%	3%	13%	-1%
	Prob. not	23%	14%	34%	21%	14%	29%	-2%
	Maybe	44%	33%	56%	30%	22%	39%	-14%
	Probably	18%	10%	28%	15%	9%	22%	-3%
	Definitely	7%	3%	16%	27%	20%	36%	20%
Sputnik V	Def. not	24%	17%	33%	35%	27%	43%	11%
	Prob. not	30%	21%	39%	24%	17%	31%	-6%
	Maybe	25%	17%	34%	17%	11%	24%	-8%
	Probably	11%	6%	18%	15%	9%	22%	4%
	Definitely	11%	6%	18%	10%	6%	17%	-1%
Sinovac	Def. not	10%	5%	20%	40%	31%	49%	29%
	Prob. not	26%	16%	37%	21%	14%	29%	-5%
	Maybe	31%	21%	43%	19%	13%	27%	-12%
	Probably	26%	16%	38%	9%	5%	16%	-17%
	Definitely	7%	2%	15%	11%	6%	17%	4%

205 Discussion

206 This study shows how scientific and public health issues such as COVID-19 vaccination are routinely
207 filtered through an in-group and nationalist lens. Nationalism in particular is so widespread in
208 contemporary culture as to pervade even a topic as seemingly technical as the safety and effectiveness
209 of a vaccine for a disease driving a global pandemic. In particular, the present study focused on
210 Germany, where the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine was by far the most positively received in our study,
211 with 98% and 99% vaccination willingness in the control and treatment group, respectively. This
212 aligns with H1, supporting the hypothesis that in-group preferences and nationalism are drivers for
213 attitudes towards vaccines and vaccination willingness. Our findings are consistent with in-group
214 preferences and nationalism as explanations for divergent attitudes towards different vaccines,
215 particularly when they are scientifically similar (as is the case with the two mRNA-based vaccines
216 assessed here: BioNTech/Pfizer and Moderna). This trend is also evident when comparing two
217 European vaccines in the pre-approval stage at the time of writing (CureVac and Sanofi/GSK).
218 Focusing on H2, people in Germany strongly favored vaccines with a European or USA origin over
219 the Chinese and Russian vaccines. This is consistent with the highly favorable country ratings for the
220 USA and the EU, compared to the low ratings for China and Russia. Strikingly, we found no

221 significant differences between China's and Russia's favorability ratings and the vaccination
222 willingness the vaccine's developed in each of these countries. The confirmation of H2 suggests that
223 in-group preferences and scientific nationalism not only apply to one's own country, but also to allied
224 countries.

225 Regarding H3, we were able to confirm significant differences in vaccination willingness between
226 respondents who were only shown the vaccine names (control group) and those who were additionally
227 shown the vaccines' national origins (treatment group). BioNTech/Pfizer and Moderna were the
228 preferred vaccines in both the control and the treatment group. However, vaccination willingness for
229 BioNTech/Pfizer was significantly greater in the treatment group compared to the control group. This
230 further supports an in-group and nationalism explanation for vaccination willingness for specific
231 vaccines. Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca vaccines showed the largest differences between
232 treatment and control groups in vaccination willingness. Likewise, Sinovac received much lower
233 vaccination willingness ratings amongst those for whom the national origin was made explicit.

234 Overall, H3 was confirmed as well, as individuals' willingness to vaccinate was consistently greater
235 for vaccines linked to 'in group' favored nations within the treatment group than the control group.

236 A limitation of this study affecting H3 is that national origins were probably already known to some
237 respondents in the control group, rendering our experimental manipulation less strong than if the
238 control group had been completely unaware of national origins. In such cases, the treatment is merely
239 increasing salience of that national origin rather than introducing it for the first time. A likely
240 implication of this limitation is that the treatment effects identified in this paper may be an
241 underestimate.

242 Against the backdrop of a generally positive public mood internationally in the wake of the pandemic
243 regarding science and its role in society [24], the news coverage of vaccines has focused on the latest
244 research about the risks (e.g., blood clots) and benefits (e.g., efficacy rates). However, drivers for
245 vaccine willingness are rarely so simple and rational. Vaccine decision-making happens within a
246 complex system of interconnected components, such as the underpinning vaccine technology, vaccine
247 delivery, and one's own background assumptions and viewpoints which is composed of various

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248 aspects (e.g., education, disease epidemiology, location within the social structure) [25]. Trust, in
249 particular, functions as a mediator within vaccine decision-making [26].

250 Additionally, the impact of awareness of national origin on vaccination willingness might change over
251 time. Another experimental study with a German-American sample conducted by Kobayashi and
252 colleagues [27] in the vaccines' pre-approval phase could not find a state bias (tendency to prefer
253 domestic vaccines over foreign ones). This contrast to our study could be an indicator that the effect
254 only becomes apparent when various options are available. On the other hand, their experimental
255 study only varied the national origin of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine as either "American" or
256 "German", while through the extensive media coverage participants might already have been aware of
257 the "double" national origin of the vaccine. Other studies on hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines in the
258 pre-approval phase support our findings on national origin as a major factor in increasing/decreasing
259 vaccination willingness [e.g., 16, 17].

260 The present study contributes to the literature on vaccine willingness by uncovering the powerful role
261 of nationalism and other in-group biases in subtly influencing attitudes about vaccines. Not only could
262 such attitudes affect vaccination rates in different countries, but they also affect the wider socio-
263 political consensus about which vaccines should even be considered for use in each country. Results
264 from the present study underscore just how ubiquitous in-group biases are.

265 The pattern identified here is by no means exclusive to the vaccine context or COVID-19 pandemic.
266 In-group biases permeate socio-political discourse, providing people with a shorthand mechanism to
267 identify who or what is trustworthy. As Douglas and Wildavsky [28 p9] pointed out, "people order
268 their universe through social bias". Yet in the COVID-19 context, the banal, accepted nature of such
269 biases is belied by the sinister consequences wrought by vaccine nationalism. The consequences of
270 nationalism in the COVID-19 era include both fueling vaccine hesitancy and underpinning a stark
271 global moral failure at the level of vaccine equity between rich and poor countries.

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344

345 **Data availability statement**

346 The datasets presented in this study can be found in online repositories. The names of the
347 repository/repositories and accession number(s) can be found here: <https://zenodo.org/record/4946140>.

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348 **Competing interests**

349 The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial
350 relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.